Connecting the Dots

That’s the central idea about the kind of intelligence work we have to do at the federal level.

That doesn’t sound hard. In fact, when you put it that way, most people ought to be good at it.

Most efforts of this sort have two parts, the collection (of the dots, if you will) and the analysis
(connecting the dots). That sounds easy enough, if you get all the dots.

But if somebody runs the dots through a strainer, and thereby holds back some of the dots, the resulting analysis will be wrongly, perhaps fatally, biased.

Suppose connecting the dots was my job.

If you don’t give me all the dots, you change the model we must then use to deploy our defenses, determine the shape the lines of defense and support will take, where and how the first responders will be trained and deployed, and where to stage reserves.

All of these could, of course, be wrongly defined by our biased model.

Wrongly prepositioned caches of medical supplies and hazard gear may be useless or undeliverable.

And it would have a definite effect upon my testimony if I survived the attack and had to answer the investigative committees and panels that will follow.

It might be hard to avoid comparisons with Jamie Gorelick and the Gorelick Wall.